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SLUMPING: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S SUPREME COURT 
BATTING AVERAGE IN FEDERAL-SENTENCING CASES 
Mark W. Bennett* 
ABSTRACT
This article responds to the increasing interest in scholarly 
legal publications of empirical studies of federal judges, in 
general, and their reversal rates, in particular. While there is 
one prior published empirical study of the Eighth Circuit, it 
involved the Circuit’s reversal rates for district judges. That 
study found that the Circuit reversed district judges who 
had prior affiliations with the Democratic party roughly one 
and a half times as often as those whose prior affiliations 
were with the Republican party. This article examines the 
top side of this issue: How well does the Eighth Circuit fare 
 * Mark W. Bennett is in his twenty-fourth year as a United States District Judge in 
the Northern District of Iowa. Judge Bennett recently accepted a new position as the first 
Director of Drake University Law School’s new Institute for Justice Reform and 
Innovation. He will do both positions until March 1, 2019, when he will retire from his 
judgeship. 
Judge Bennett is grateful to Zachary Nielsen, a recent graduate of the University of 
Colorado Law School, who provided extensive and invaluable research for this article 
while an intern in his chambers during the summer of 2015. Judge Bennett also wishes to 
thank Professor Robert Steinbuch of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. 
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when its decisions and its positions are reviewed by the 
Supreme Court? The article compares the Eighth Circuit to 
its sister circuits, with a special emphasis on federal-
sentencing decisions. The data indicate that the Eighth 
Circuit is reversed more often than the infamous Ninth. It 
may not be surprising that, in every sentencing decision of 
the Eighth Circuit reviewed by the Supreme Court over the 
past twelve years, the Eighth Circuit sided with the 
Department of Justice. What is surprising is that the 
Supreme Court reversed those decisions 100 percent of the 
time. The article also argues for greater transparency for 
reversal and affirmance rates throughout the federal 
judiciary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Steinbuch’s empirical analysis of 2008 reversal 
rates for district judges in the Eighth Circuit appeared in 2009.1
One caveat is in order. Judge Bennett did not make Professor Steinbuch’s list of 
district judges in the Eighth Circuit most reversed for abuse of discretion, no doubt due to 
Steinbuch’s decision to exclude reversals in federal-sentencing cases. See Robert 
Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuit During 2008, 43 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 51, 64 (2009) (listing most-reversed judges, but noting that list did not 
include  “judges who were reversed in cases involving sentencing guidelines, given the 
state of flux of this area of the law during the time period being examined”). In sentencing 
cases, Judge Bennett likely led the pack. For example, in Spears v. United States, 552 U.S. 
1090 (2008) (granting certiorari and vacating and remanding for further consideration in 
light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)) and Pepper v. United States, 562 
U.S. 476 (2011) (vacating in part, affirming in part, and remanding for resentencing), 
Judge Bennett’s sentencing positions were reversed by the Eighth Circuit a whopping five 
times, twice by that court en banc. However, Judge Bennett’s analysis and holdings were 
ultimately vindicated by the Supreme Court. See Spears, 552 U.S. 1090; Pepper, 562 U.S. 
476; see also Mark W. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching? The War On Drugs, Mass 
Incarceration, Doing Kimbrough Justice, And A Response To Two Third Circuit Judges,
66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873, 896–98 & nn. 117, 122, 129 (2014) (discussing Spears and 
Pepper and providing relevant case citations). 
 1. Steinbuch, supra note *. Professor Steinbuch also published two follow-up articles. 
See Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Conservative, Liberal, and Other “Biases” 
In The United States Courts Of Appeals For The Eighth & Ninth Circuits, 11 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 217, 255 (2012) (“This study concludes that for the full-year data sets analyzed, 
the Eighth Circuit has a political-party bias, while the Ninth Circuit does not. To the extent 
that this phenomenon repeats itself, it is likely reflective of the fact that the Eighth Circuit 
is almost completely Republican, while the Ninth Circuit is only marginally Democratic.”); 
Robert Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights and Findings on the Eighth Circuit, 44 LOY.
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Using logistic regression analysis, he concluded that the heavily 
Republican Eighth Circuit2 reversed district judges affiliated 
with the Democratic Party one and a half times as often as it 
reversed those affiliated with the Republican Party.3 This should 
not be too surprising. As Professor Steinbuch points out, “there 
is no evidence in this study to suggest that politics was a direct 
and nefarious cause of the higher reversal rate of Democratic 
judges.”4 Rather, he found “a latent but discernible correlation 
between a district court judge’s political party affiliation and the 
propensity of the Eighth Circuit to reverse the judge’s 
decisions.”5 While well beyond the scope of this article, I 
suggest this is likely due more to differing judicial philosophies 
than to political affiliation.6
Without addressing the political-affiliation issue, I look at 
the reverse top-side of this: How well does the Eighth Circuit 
fare when its decisions are reviewed by the Supreme Court, 
especially in the federal-sentencing area? In other words, what is 
between a district judge’s political affiliation and the rate at which the judge is reversed.”) 
[hereinafter Steinbuch, Further Insights]. 
2. At the time Steinbuch’s original article was published, the Eighth Circuit had 
“fourteen Republican and three Democratic . . . judges, and seven of the active judges were 
all appointed by President George W. Bush.” Steinbuch, supra note *, at 64. 
3. Steinbuch, supra note *, at 51; see also id. at 56–57 (characterizing each district 
judge as “identified with a political party . . . based on the political party of the 
[appointing] president,” but acknowledging that “[t]he political designation of the 
appointing president may not always reflect the individual judge’s actual political 
philosophy,” while also pointing out that “many believe that it serves as a fair and 
objective proxy for the judge’s political philosophy and political party affiliation” ); but see
Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L. REV. 1895, 
1919–22 (2009) (recognizing that “[t]his party-of-appointing-president (‘PAP’) proxy 
measure has come under criticism,” and summarizing a few illustrative critiques). 
4. Steinbuch, supra note *, at 65. 
5. Id.
6. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic 
Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 769–70 (2005) (“Nonetheless, 
the growing body of research indicates that political ideology is a significant influence 
(‘significant’ in the statistical sense, that is, not being a product of random chance) that 
recurrently (but not invariably) emerges in studies of judicial decisionmaking and that has a 
non-negligible effect on the judicial enterprise.”); but see Corey Rayburn Yung, Beyond 
Ideology: An Empirical Study of Partisanship and Independence in the Federal Courts, 80 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 550 (2012) (“The most basic choices judges on the courts of 
appeals can make—to dissent, to concur separately, or to reverse the district court 
judgment—are better predicted and explained by utilizing the measures of partisanship and 
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that court’s batting average in the Supreme Court? For a macro 
look, and to set a baseline, I compare the affirmance/reversal 
record—the batting average—of the Eighth Circuit over the 
decade from 2005 to 2015 with those of the other circuits on all 
merits cases decided by the Supreme Court. I then narrow the 
focus to take a more in-depth look at how the Eighth Circuit 
fared in its federal-sentencing decisions reviewed by the 
Supreme Court from 2005 to 2015. I chose this time frame 
because of the constitutional sea change in federal sentencing 
created by the Supreme Court’s landmark decision declaring the 
Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory in United 
States v. Booker.7 This sea change generated many federal-
sentencing issues for the Supreme Court to decide. For the same 
decade, I also compare the batting average of the Eighth Circuit 
in the Supreme Court on federal-sentencing issues decided by 
the high court in cases arising from circuits excluding the 
Eighth.8 Finally, I determined the individual batting averages for 
each of the Eighth Circuit judges involved in federal-sentencing 
decisions during the decade both for the Supreme Court’s 
review of those Eighth Circuit sentencing decisions directly—as 
well as for the Supreme Court’s review of sentencing decisions 
decided from the other circuits—on which the Eighth Circuit 
had also opined. 
Were there a World Series for the federal courts of appeals 
over the last decade, the Eighth Circuit franchise would not have 
been in it. They would not have even made the playoffs. Indeed, 
by every measure, including batting averages of individual 
Eighth Circuit judges and team batting averages of panels and 
7. 543 U.S. 220 (2015). For a discussion of the Booker revolution and post-Booker
sentencing see Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind 
Spot” Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental 
Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 513–18 (2014). 
8.  In order to determine this last comparison, I researched whether the Eighth Circuit 
had decided a federal-sentencing issue that later came before the Supreme Court from 
another circuit, which necessarily involved a measure of subjective judgment. I tried to err 
on the side of giving the Eighth Circuit the benefit of the doubt. I also strove to find the 
first time the Eighth Circuit had decided the question—so that only those judges on the first 
panel were scored—because judges writing subsequent opinions are bound by the first 
panel opinion as circuit precedent. Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(“‘[A] panel of this Court is bound by a prior Eighth Circuit decision unless that case is 
overruled by the Court sitting en banc.’” (quoting United States v. Wright, 22 F.3d 787, 
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the en banc court, the Eighth Circuit most resembled a perennial 
division cellar dweller—surpassing the infamous Ninth Circuit.9
Indeed, as discussed in more detail to follow, on the seven at-
bats in the Supreme Court on their own federal-sentencing 
decisions, the Eighth Circuit failed to get on base, striking out 
seven consecutive times. 
A. Citation Studies 
Before turning to the data on Team Eighth Circuit, a brief 
overview of empirical research on federal judges is in order. In 
recent years, the “most prominent approaches”10 use databases 
of citations to reported opinions in an attempt to measure 
“influence,” “prestige,” or “quality of judges.”11 For example, 
one of the first empirical studies of judges, by Professors 
Landes, Lessig, and Solimine, used the citations to published 
opinions “to estimate empirically the influence of individual 
judges.”12 The authors conceded that using the number of 
citations was “at best a crude and rough proxy for measuring 
influence,”13 yet asserted that their quantitative analysis offers 
significant advantages over other approaches because it is less 
subjective and relies less on non-quantifiable factors.14
Frustrated with the appointment process for Supreme Court 
9. See Table 1, infra page 65. 
10. Robert Anderson, Distinguishing Judges: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Quality 
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 76 MO. L. REV. 315, 317 (2010). 
11. Id.
12. William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A 
Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 325 (1998) 
(“Although citation analysis provides only a proxy for quantifying judicial influence, it 
offers some significant advantages over more conventional literary and historical 
approaches to the study of influence. First, citation analysis relies less on subjective and 
non-quantifiable factors and, instead, employs quantitative measures of influence using 
well-known statistical techniques. Second, it enables one to compare differences in 
influence among a large number of judges and to test the statistical significance of these 
differences.”) The authors also used extensive regression analysis to examine a myriad of 
other factors to explain “differences in the influences of individual judges.” Id. at 276 
(describing analytic approach), 318–25 (including data tables).  
13. Id. at 271. 
14. Id. at 325. Professor Steinbuch has also noted that, while empirical research in the 
context of reversal rates has its own flaws, it “should be understood and embraced as the 
rigorous and objective method of evaluation that it is.” Steinbuch, Further Insights, supra
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Justices, Professors Choi and Gulati followed that study with 
their recommendation for a Tournament of Judges using citation 
rates as one of several objective measures in a World Series 
Playoffs-like contest.15 The “reward to the winner” was not an 
MVP selection or induction into the Hall of Fame, but 
“elevation to the Supreme Court.”16 In a follow-up study and 
article, Professors Choi and Gulati computed their Tournament 
of Judges to offer to the President and the public their view of 
the most objectively qualified federal appeals judges to be 
elevated to the Supreme Court.17 The Tournament of Judges idea 
generated significant response, and a lot of Bronx cheers,18 from 
the academy, resulting in a law-review symposium on the topic 
in 2005.19 Another citation study that used both positive and 
negative citations to circuit judges’ opinions to rank them on 
judicial quality concluded that a majority of the federal appellate 
judges “are indistinguishable from one another in terms of the 
quality of their work product.”20
15. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges? 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 299 
(2004) (“Among the criteria that could be used are opinion publication rates, citations of 
opinions by other courts, citations by the Supreme Court, citations by academics, dissent 
rates, and speed of disposition of cases.”). 
16. Id.
17. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing The Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking Of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 29–30 (2004) (“This 
Article presents a set of simple and objective measures to evaluate judicial merit, placing 
judges in a tournament of sorts using criteria correlated (albeit imperfectly) with widely 
held notions of merit. Our simple measures do not provide a perfect metric for judging 
skill, but that is not the standard at which we are aiming. The goal is to demonstrate the 
availability of a set of objective measures for which we can easily collect data and analyze 
and that would better identify, at the outset, a merit-worthy pool of Supreme Court 
candidates.”).  
18. Bronx cheer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Bronx%20cheer (2018) (defining the Bronx cheer as “a rude sound 
made to show that you dislike something”).  
19. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey & Jim Rossi, Empirical Measures of Judicial 
Performance: An Introduction to the Symposium, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001 (2005). The 
symposium generated seventeen papers and essays by twenty-two members of the 
academy, judges, and practicing lawyers; see generally id. (summarizing symposium 
articles). 
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B. Reversal Rate Studies 
In addition to citations, reversal rates are commonly used in 
empirical studies of various aspects of judicial 
decisionmaking.21  Scholars have advocated the use of reversal 
rates as a measure of judicial quality and they are “commonly 
used to evaluate circuits.”22  Judge O’Scannlain of the Ninth 
Circuit  has published two articles reflecting on how cases from 
the Ninth Circuit fared in the Supreme Court in the decade 
following October Term 2000.23 He concluded about his own 
circuit that its decade record in the Supreme Court was 
“strikingly poor.”24 Judge O’Scannlain determined, in his review 
of Team Ninth Circuit’s batting average in the Supreme Court 
from 2000 to 2010, that the Ninth Circuit was hitting below the 
Mendoza Line,25 at a mere .190.26 One scholar has warned, 
however, that “commentators agree about what the Ninth 
Circuit’s reversal rate is, but they have sharply differing views 
about its normative implications.”27
These quantitative citation studies have revealed empirical 
information that is not well known in either the legal community 
or to the public at large, other than the general perception that 
the reversal record of the Ninth Circuit in the Supreme Court is 
21. Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship,
162 U. PA. L. REV. 117, 139 (2013) (noting also that reversal rates are “widely used to 
justify normative claims about judges and courts”). 
22. Id.
23. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade Of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the 
Supreme Court Since October Term 2000, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1557 (2010) 
[hereinafter O’Scannlain, Decade—Lewis & Clark]; Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade 
Of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record In The Supreme Court Through the October Term 
2010, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2165 (2012) (transcribing lecture largely based on 
O’Scannlain, Decade—Lewis & Clark, supra this note) [hereinafter O’Scannlain, 
Decade—Notre Dame]. 
24. O’Scannlain, Decade—Lewis & Clark, supra note 23, at 1557; O’Scannlain, 
Decade—Notre Dame, supra note 23, at 2165. 
25. See, e.g., Dave Seminara, Branded for Life with “The Mendoza Line”, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH (July 6, 2010), https://www.stltoday.com/sports/baseball/professional/ 
branded-for-life-with-the-mendoza-line/article_cff05af5-032e-5a29-b5a8-ecc9216b0c02.html 
(noting that “[w]hile the Mendoza Line has come to symbolize the .200 mark in baseball 
parlance, the phrase has also crossed over into America’s pop culture lexicon and is 
frequently used to describe almost any type of sub-par performance”). 
26. O’Scannlain, Decade—Lewis & Clark, supra note 23, at 1558 (pointing out that 
“the Ninth Circuit got it wrong in 81% of its cases that the Supreme Court agreed to hear”).
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higher than all other circuits (which is no longer true).28  The 
individual batting averages of judges and the team batting 
averages of courts do not seem to be a matter of much public 
concern, nor are they readily available to the public.29
It has been observed that federal circuit judges have an 
“almost-groupie-like following and a set of statistical enthusiasts 
who take a back seat only to the zeal of sports statistical 
buffs.”30 Yet it is important to note that the issue of Supreme 
Court reversal rates for the circuits is “complex and nuanced.”31
Because the granting of review from the courts of appeals is 
almost always discretionary, and no reasons for the decision of 
four Justices to review a lower court decision are generally 
given, the decision to review a case is clouded in secrecy and 
not amenable to meaningful quantitative analysis. Thus, Senior 
Judge Edwards of the D.C. Circuit has warned that quantitative 
analysis of judicial decisionmaking “must be viewed with great 
caution.”32 One of Judge Edwards’s caveats is that “[r]egression 
analysis does not do well in capturing the nuances of human 
personalities and relationships, so empirical studies on judicial 
decision making that rely solely on this tool are inherently 
flawed.”33 Yet others defend the use of “reversal rates as 
performance indicators for circuit judges.”34 Professor Sisk has 
eloquently described the balance between empirical analysis and 
the more traditional theoretical and doctrinal approach: 
Empirical study of the courts should remain a mainstay of 
legal scholarship: it reminds us of the reality of 
multifarious influences on judges, allows us to identify 
patterns that are not readily discernable in unsystematic 
reading of opinions, and offers us significant explanatory 
28. See Table 1, infra page 65; see also Stephen J. Wermiel, Supreme Court Reversals: 
Exploring the Seventh Circuit, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 641, 645–46 (2008) (explaining that in the 
October terms 1986, 1987, 1989, 1996, 1998, and 2005 the Seventh Circuit had a worse 
batting average in the Supreme Court than the Ninth). 
29. Although the citation studies have drawn “considerable attention in legal 
scholarship,” not all of it is favorable. Anderson, supra note 10 at 317–18. 
30. Wermiel, supra note 28, at 642 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 655. 
32. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003). 
33. Id.
34. Fischman, supra note 21 at 139 n.112 (citing Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, 
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power in certain discrete categories of cases. However, 
theoretical and doctrinal work will never be supplanted. 
Judges have long insisted that the tools of the law—the text 
and structure of legal documents, procedural requirements, 
legal history, common-law reasoning, and precedent—
remain essential elements to fully understanding and 
deciding a legal controversy. Because of difficulties in 
quantifying legal elements for empirical study, and the 
consequent limited explanatory power of quantitative 
models of judicial decision making, the qualitative forms of 
legal scholarship, both theoretical and doctrinal, have 
ample room within which to operate and contribute to a 
fuller understanding of legal decisions.35
In many ways, the judicial branch is the least transparent 
branch of government. The Justices of the Supreme Court have 
vehemently resisted broadcasting their oral arguments.36 Neither 
the courts of appeals nor the district courts do anything official 
to post their batting averages.37 One can easily find the voting 
record of a state or federal legislator, or the Presidents’ veto 
records, with a simple Google search or a visit to any one of 
numerous websites.38 Yet try to find the judicial record of state 
or federal trial judges or appellate judges not on the Supreme 
Court! One of the purposes of this article is to promote judicial 
35. Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal 
Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 877–78 (2008) (footnote 
omitted).
36. See, e.g., Kyu Ho Youm, Cameras in the Courtroom in the Twenty-First Century: 
The U.S. Supreme Court Learning from Abroad? 2012 BYU L. REV. 1989, 2004 (2012) 
(treating decision about broadcasting district court proceedings as indirect evidence of 
Supreme Court’s disinclination to broadcast oral arguments); Jonathan Sherman, End the 
Supreme Court’s Ban on Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (April 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/04/24/opinion/open-the-supreme-court-to-cameras.html (reviewing recent history). 
37. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–347 Title II § 205(a), 116 Stat. 2899 
(2002) (requiring all federal courts to establish and maintain websites, but not requiring 
batting-average information to appear on circuit websites).  
38. See, e.g., Voting Records, GOVTRACK (n.d.) https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
votes (indicating that site’s database “shows the outcome of all recorded votes on the 
Senate floor and House floor” and including a search filter enabling date-limited searches 
back to the first session of Congress in 1789); MICHIGAN VOTES (2018), http://www 
.michiganvotes.org (describing site as “providing concise, non-partisan, plain-English 
descriptions of every bill and vote in the Michigan House and Senate); Summary of Bills 
Vetoed, 1789–Present, UNITED STATES SENATE (n.d.), https://www.senate.gov/reference/ 
Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm (including table showing all presidential vetoes since 
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transparency through greater use of empirical data. Just as 
baseball fans would never let their favorite team get away with 
failing to publish their team’s statistics, the courts should 
consider and debate doing the same. There are plenty members 
of the academy and the legal profession who author hundreds, if 
not thousands, of law review and other articles, and 
commentary, including blog posts, that comment on and present 
insights concerning judges in the federal judiciary. Perhaps both 
the academy the judiciary could take the lead in posting 
empirical data about their reversal/affirmance rates. 
II. THE BATTING AVERAGE OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COMPARED 
TO THE BATTING AVERAGES OF OTHER CIRCUITS
A. Introduction to Supreme Court Reversal Rates 
One not well versed in every nuance of all things Supreme 
Court might think that over the long run, perhaps many decades, 
the Supreme Court reversal rate of every federal court of appeals 
would approximate fifty percent. After all, Supreme Court 
decisions are for the most part binary, that is, a lower court 
decision is either affirmed or reversed. However, the fifty-
percent notion has not been the case because the Supreme Court 
reverses more cases than it affirms.39 For example, the reversal 
rate for the October Term 2001 was seventy-five percent; for the 
October Term 2002, seventy-four percent; for the October Term 
2003, seventy-six percent; for the October Term 2004, seventy-
one percent; for the October Term 2005, seventy percent; and 
for the October Term 2006, seventy-four percent.40 In the 
decade on which I focus for this analysis of the Eighth Circuit’s 
reversal rate at the Supreme Court (2005 through 2015), the 
reversal rate for all of the circuits averaged 72.9 percent.41 Some 
suspect that, given the few cases that the Supreme Court now 
reviews, the Justices are more inclined to review cases in which 
they disagree than to place their “imprimatur on cases with 
39. See Table 1, infra page 65.
40. Wermiel, supra note 28, at 643–44.
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which they agree.”42  However, this theory is dispelled by the 
chart below, which contains the total reviewed decisions and the 
affirmance percentage rates for each circuit from the 1946 
through 2001 Terms.43
Supreme Court Affirmance Percentages, by Circuit 
October Terms 1946–2001













No circuit from 1946 to 2001 had an average affirmance 
rate of fifty percent, although the First, Second, and Third 
Circuits averaged at least forty-five percent.44 During this period, 
the Eighth Circuit’s average affirmance rate was a middling 38.6 
percent—better than the affirmance rates of five circuits, but not 
as good as the affirmance rates of the other six.45
It makes intuitive sense that, when the Supreme Court 
grants a petition for certiorari on a circuit split, it is more likely 
to take the case that was wrongly decided. This would, of 
course, mean more reversals in Supreme Court cases addressing 
circuit splits. It is also important, for context, to note that only a 
42. Wermiel, supra note 28, at 645.
43. See Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1347 n.89 (2005) (reproducing data 
published some time ago by Professor Epstein); see also LEE EPSTEIN, ET AL., THE 
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 697–99 (3d ed. 
2003) (table 7-29).  
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tiny percentage of cases decided by all the federal courts of 
appeals ever reach the Supreme Court. The reversal rates of any 
federal court of appeals would be very tiny, about one tenth of 
one percent, “if calculated as the total number of cases reversed 
over the total number of appeals terminated by that court.”46
B. Comparing Batting Averages of the Federal Courts of 
Appeals on All Issues Reviewed by the Supreme Court 
2005–2015
Looking at the decade from 2005 through 2015, Table 1 
below shows the affirmance and reversal rates of the federal 
courts of appeals for all decisions—including federal-sentencing 
decisions—reviewed by the Supreme Court on the merits.47
During the last decade, the federal courts of appeals as a whole 
had a batting average of .271.48 The Eighth Circuit was affirmed 
at a significantly lower rate, batting only .176 over that period.49
This is an even lower rate than that the usually shaky Ninth 
Circuit, which batted .188 over the same period,50 and also 
lower than the Ninth Circuit’s batting average over the time 
period of Judge O’Scannlain’s study, which was .190.51
46. Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, LANDSLIDE 8, 8 (Jan./Feb. 2010) (footnote omitted); see also Fischman, supra
note 21, at 143 (“The proportion of cases that are appealed is especially relevant when the 
reviewing court is the U.S. Supreme Court, which hears only a tiny fraction of petitioned 
cases. For example, Judge Jerome Farris observed that the Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit in 28 out of 29 cases it reviewed in 1997. Yet he defended the Ninth Circuit 
by arguing that the Court let stand more than 99% of all Ninth Circuit decisions from the 
previous year.”). 
47. See Stat Pack Archive, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2006—June 30, 2015), http://www 
.scotusblog.com/reference/stat-pack/ [hereinafter SCOTUSBLOG Statistics] (offering links 
to SCOTUSblog-compiled end-of-Term statistics that include totals of cases affirmed, 
reversed, or affirmed in part by each of the thirteen circuits for each year). The numbers in 
Table 1 were derived by comparing decade totals from the SCOTUSblog Stat Pack Archive
with the total number of cases reviewed by the Supreme Court from each of the thirteen 
circuits to compute average affirmance, reversal, and affirmance-in-part rates.  
48. Id. Readers should note that the omnibus affirmance rate of 27.1 percent shown in 
the “Total” line of Table 1 correlates to a batting average of .271. A similar affirmance-
rate-to-batting-average conversion can be made for any circuit using the relevant number 
from Table 1.   
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. O’Scannlain, Decade—Notre Dame, supra note 23, at 2166 (referring to Ninth 
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The batting average of the Eighth Circuit was lower than 
that of every other circuit with the exception of the Sixth, which 
batted .172.52 With the exceptions of the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits, every circuit had a team batting average above 
.200.53 The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and 
D.C. Circuits all hit better than .300.54 The First Circuit had the 
best team batting average over the decade, hitting an impressive 
.500 and hitting thirty-six points better than the runner-up Tenth 
Circuit, batting .464.55 Table 1 shows affirmance and reversal 
rates, and Chart 1 illustrates the affirmance rates, of each of the 
circuits on cases reviewed by the Supreme Court over the 
designated time period. 
Table 1 
Affirmance Rate by Circuit Since 2005
Circuit Cases % of Total Aff Aff % Rev Rev % Aff in Part Aff in Part % 
First 20 3.1 10 50 10 50 1 5 
Second 7 8.7 19 33.3 38 66.7 0 0 
Third 35 5,2 10 29.4 24 70.6 0 0 
Fourth 39 6.0 15 38.5 24 61,5 0 0 
Fifth 52 8.0 12 23.1 40 76.9 1 1.9 
Sixth 58 8.9 10 17.2 48 82.8 0 0 
Seventh 42 6.4 15 35.7 27 64.3 0 0 
Eighth 34 5.2 6 17.6 28 82.4 1 2.9 
Ninth 170 26.1 32 18.8 138 81.2 4 2.4 
Tenth 28 4.3 13 46.4 15 53.6 0 0 
Eleventh 50 7.7 14 28 36 72 0 0 
D.C. 28 4.3 10 35.7 18 64.3 2 7.1 
Federal 40 6.1 11 27.5 29 72.5 0 0 
TOTAL 652 100 177 27.1 475 72.9 9 1.4 











1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 D.C. Fed.
Chart 1 
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C. Comparing Batting Averages on Non-Sentencing Cases 
Reviewed by the Supreme Court 
When federal-sentencing decisions are removed from the 
statistics, the circuits, as a whole, fare slightly worse.56 Table 2 
shows the affirmance and reversal rates of all the circuits on 
non-sentencing issue cases since 2005.57 Chart 2 displays the 
affirmance rate of each of the circuits over the same period with 
the sentencing-issue cases removed.58 In such non-sentencing 
cases, the circuits, as a whole, had a slightly lower batting 
average of .265 from 2005 to 2015. However, when federal-
sentencing decisions are removed from the statistics, the Eighth 
Circuit was affirmed at a higher rate than it was with the 
sentencing decisions included. In non-sentencing cases, the 
Eighth Circuit had a batting average of .222 over the designated 
time period, compared to hitting only .176 when sentencing 
cases are included. Removing federal-sentencing decisions, 
however, moves the Eighth Circuit up only one spot from 
having the second-worst to the third-worst team batting average 
among the circuits. 
56. See Table 2. To compute the affirmance and reversal rates for non-sentencing cases, 
I simply determined the number of cases on federal-sentencing issues that the Supreme 
Court reviewed from each of the circuits (which are not shown in Table 2) and subtracted 
those cases from the numbers for each of the circuits in Table 1 to determine new rates of 
affirmance, reversal, and affirmance in part.  
57. Id.
58. Chart 2, infra page 67.  
Table 2 
Affirmance Rate (Excluding Sentencing Cases) 
by Circuit since 2005
Circuit Cases Aff Aff % Rev Rev % Aff in Part Aff in Part % 
First 16 8 50 8 50 1 6.3 
Second 57 19 33.3 38 66.7 0 0
Third 32 8 25 24 75 0 0
Fourth 35 13 37.1 22 62.9 0 0
Fifth 48 10 20.8 40 79.2 1 2.1 
Sixth 57 10 17.5 38 82.5 0 0
Seventh 36 12 33.3 47 66.7 0 0
Eighth 27 6 22.2 24 77.8 1 3.7 
Ninth 167 32 19.2 135 80.8 4 2.4 
Tenth 27 13 48.1 14 51.9 0 0
Eleventh 46 11 23.9 35 76.1 0 0
D.C. 28 10 35.7 18 64.3 2 7.1 
Federal 40 11 27.5 29 72.5 0 0
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D. Comparing Batting Averages on all Cases Reviewed by the 
Supreme Court, Eighth Circuit Sentencing Decisions Excluded
The Eighth Circuit has had an unimpressive record on 
federal-sentencing issues when reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
Table 3 shows the affirmance and reversal rates of all decisions 
reviewed by the Supreme Court since 2005, excluding only the 
seven cases from the Eighth Circuit on federal-sentencing 
issues.59 Table 3 shows the absolute numbers of affirmances, 
and Chart 3 displays the affirmance rates, for each of the circuits 
since 2005, excluding only the same seven cases.60 These 
numbers were calculated in an attempt to show how the Eighth 
Circuit would have stacked up against other circuits had it not 
gone zero for seven on federal-sentencing issues from 2005 
through 2015. However, the Eighth Circuit, batting .222, would 
still be the third-worst hitting team even if those seven reversals 
were not included. In other words, the Eighth Circuit is among 
the worst-hitting teams in the league—even without considering 
the zero-for-seven federal-sentencing-case slump. 









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 D.C. Fed.
Chart 2 
Affirmance Rate (Excluding Sentencing Cases)
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Table 3 
Affirmance Rate by Circuit (Excluding Eighth Circuit Sentencing Cases) 
Since 2005




First 20 3.1 10 50.0 10 50.0 1 5
Second 57 8.8 19 33.3 38 66.7 0 0
Third 34 5.3 10 29.4 24 70.6 0 0
Fourth 39 6.0 15 38.5 24 61.5 0 0
Fifth 52 8.1 12 23.1 40 76.9 1 1.9
Sixth 58 9.0 10 1.2 48 82.8 0 0
Seventh 42 6.5 15 35.7 27 64.3 0 0
Eighth 27 4.2 6 22.2 28 77.8 1 3.7
Ninth 170 26.4 32 18.8 138 81.2 4 2.4
Tenth 28 4.3 13 46.4 15 53.6 0 0
Eleventh 50 7.8 14 28.0 36 72.0 0 0
D.C. 28 4.3 10 35.7 18 64.3 2 7.1
Federal 40 6.2 11 27.5 29 72.5 0 0








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 D.C. Fed.
Chart 3  
Affirmance Rate by Circuit 
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II. THERE ARE REVERSALS AND THEN THERE ARE REVERSALS
A. The Eighth Circuit Goes Hitless for a Decade 
on Federal-Sentencing Cases Reviewed by the Supreme Court 
1. The Supreme Court’s Voting Record
During the decade of this study, every federal-sentencing 
decision from the Eighth Circuit reviewed on the merits by the 
Supreme Court was reversed—without even one being a close 
decision. Team Eighth Circuit appeared to be overmatched at the 
plate. Starting with the most recent decision and working 
backwards in time, here are the results: 
Johnson was reversed in an eight-to-one vote.61
In Burrage, Team Eighth Circuit struck out looking, 
reversed by a unanimous vote.62
Pepper was reversed by a six-to-two margin.63
Spears was reversed in a summary disposition, 
which is akin to striking out on three straight 
pitches.64
61. Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S Ct. 2551 (2015). 
62. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). As Yale Law School’s “eminent 
constitutional scholar Akhil Amar has put it, ‘When you’re not picking up votes of anyone 
on the Court, something is screwy.’” O’Scannlain, Decade—Notre Dame, supra note 23, at 
2166 (footnote omitted) (citing Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Does the 
Supreme Court Hate the Ninth Circuit? A Dialogue on Why That Appeals Court Fares So 
Poorly, FINDLAW (Apr. 19, 2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar /20020419.html.). 
Judge O’Scannlain was at that point criticizing his own circuit’s record in the Supreme 
Court as “strikingly poor.” Id. at 2165.
63. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, ___, 121 S. Ct. 1229 (2011). Justice Kagan 
took no part in the decision. 121 S. Ct. at 1235. 
64. Spears v. U.S., 555 U.S. 261 (2009). The case was likely not nearly as close as the 
five-to-four margin indicates on the surface. The Chief Justice dissented in an opinion 
joined by Justice Alito, describing the “summary reversal” as “bitter medicine,” Spears v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 261, 268 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., & Alito, J., dissenting), and noting 
that as explained by “the majority here and the dissenting judges below, there are cogent 
arguments that the Eighth Circuit’s decision was contrary to our decision last Term in 
Kimbrough v. United States,” id. Justice Kennedy voted to “grant the petition for a writ of 
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Greenlaw and Gall were both reversed in seven-to-
two votes.65
Lopez was reversed in an eight-to-one vote.66
This is not like the Ninth Circuit where, despite unanimous 
reversals, there is “no shortage of examples in which the 
reversal of the Ninth Circuit was made by a deeply divided 
Supreme Court.”67
In sum, the Eighth Circuit was outvoted fifty to twelve in 
the seven federal-sentencing decisions—all reversed by the 
Supreme Court.68 Table 4 shows the voting record of the 
Justices on all seven of the federal-sentencing decisions from the 
Eighth Circuit since 2005. 
Justices Alito and Thomas were the only Justices to 
consistently vote with the Eighth Circuit. Interestingly, Justice 
Thomas had been the Eighth Circuit Justice until Justice Alito 
joined the Court. No stranger to baseball statistics,69 Justice 
Alito voted with the Eighth Circuit on five out of seven 
decisions. Justice Thomas voted with the Eighth Circuit on four 
out of seven. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens and 
Kennedy each voted with the Eighth Circuit only once. None of 
the other Justices voted with the Eighth Circuit during the 
designated period—not once.70 The fact that Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Scalia so seldom voted to 
affirm the federal-sentencing decisions of the Eighth Circuit 
(just three votes out of twenty-one) reflects the observation of 
Judge O’Scannlain, but in reverse, that “the general frequency 
65. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 
(2007).
66. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006). 
67. Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths About the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
355, 360 (2006). 
68. This vote count gives the Eighth Circuit the benefit of the votes by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Alito in Spears, assuming that, had the case been briefed and argued on 
the merits, they would have voted to affirm despite their admission that the majority in the 
per curiam had cogent arguments. Id.
69. Adam Liptak, This Bench Belongs in a Dugout, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2010) http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/us/01bar.html (“Consider Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., a 
Phillies fan, who last year contributed an essay to The Baseball Research Journal.”). 
70. Over the time period, Justice Sotomayor succeeded Justice Souter in 2009 and 





      11/20/2018   11:50:28
40768-aap_19-1 Sheet No. 40 Side A      11/20/2018   11:50:28
BENNETTRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/9/2018 6:29 PM 
SENTENCING CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT 71
with which even “liberal” [substitute “conservative”] Justices 
vote to reverse, it is safe to say that reversing the Ninth 
[substitute Eighth] Circuit is much more than just a matter of 
ideology.”71
Table 4 
Supreme Court Voting on Eighth Circuit Sentencing Cases Since 2005
Case Voted With Circuit Voted Against Circuit Recused 
Johnson Alito 
Roberts Scalia Kennedy Thomas 
Ginsburg Breyer Sotomayor 
Kagan 
Burrage 
Roberts Scalia Kennedy Thomas 
Ginsburg Breyer Alito 
Sotomayor Kagan 
Pepper Thomas Alito Roberts Scalia Kennedy Ginsburg Breyer Sotomayor Kagan 
Spears Roberts Kennedy Thomas Alito 
Stevens Scalia Souter Ginsburg 
Breyer
Greenlaw Stevens Alito Roberts Scalia Kennedy Souter Thomas Ginsburg Breyer 
Gall Thomas Alito Roberts Stevens Scalia Kennedy Souter Ginsburg Breyer 
Lopez Thomas Roberts Stevens Scalia Kennedy, Souter Ginsburg Breyer Alito 
2. Eighth Circuit Judges’ Individual Batting Averages 
Table 5 illustrates the voting record, much like individual 
batting averages, of the judges sitting on the Eighth Circuit for 
the seven federal-sentencing decisions reviewed by the Supreme 
Court between 2005 and 2015.72 Judges Bye, Colloton, Lay, 
Melloy, Smith, and Wollman were the only judges to get a hit in 
any at-bat. Judges Bye and Lay, who would likely find 
themselves in the middle of Team Eighth Circuit’s batting order, 
71. O’Scannlain, Decade—Lewis & Clark, supra note 23 at 1559.
72. Because all seven of the federal-sentencing-issue cases reviewed by the Supreme 
Court were reversed, a judge must have dissented in order to be classified in Table 5 as 
making a “correct” decision. The statistics include en banc decisions, in which all of the 
non-dissenting judges were scored as getting the decision incorrect. Spears was heard twice 
at the Eighth Circuit, so the judges in each of those decisions are scored accordingly. 
Pepper was heard three times at the Eighth Circuit, so the judges in each of those decisions 
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were the only judges to vote correctly in over half of the cases in 
which they participated. Judge Lay went one for one in his 
single at-bat. Judge Bye batted an impressive .670, going two 
for three. 
Table 5 
Eighth Circuit Judges’ Voting Records 
in Sentencing Cases Since 2005
Judge Cases Correct (includes en banc) Percentage
Arnold** 2 0 0
Beam 2 0 0
Benton 3 0 0
Bowman 2 0 0
Bye 3 2 67 
Colloton 3 1 33 
Gruender 3 0 0
Hansen 1 0 0
Heaney 1 0 0
Lay 1 1 100 
Loken 3 0 0
Melloy 3 1 33 
Murphy 4 0 0
Riley † 6 0 0
Shepard 2 0 0
Smith 5 1 20 
Wollman 3 1 33 
TOTAL 47 7 15 
** Participated in Pepper I and Pepper II
Participated in Spears I (en banc) and Spears II (en banc)
† Participated in Pepper I, Pepper II, and Pepper III
B. Other Circuits’ Batting Averages in Federal-Sentencing 
Cases Reviewed by the Supreme Court 
Over the same period, several of the other circuits fared 
much better on federal-sentencing decisions reviewed by the 
Supreme Court than did the Eighth Circuit. The First, Fourth, 
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.500 on federal-sentencing issues. The Eleventh and Third 
Circuits had batting averages of .750 and 1.00, respectively. 
Overall, the circuits were affirmed on fourteen out of thirty-six 
federal-sentencing decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
This computes to a batting average of .389, a relatively 
impressive hitting record when compared to the zero hits that 
Team Eighth Circuit got over the same period. Table 6 shows 
the affirmance rate of all the circuits on federal-sentencing 
decisions since 2005. 
Table 6 
Supreme Court Sentencing Cases by Circuit 
Since 2005 
Circuit Cases Correct Percentage
First 4 2 50
Second 0 0 0
Third 2 2 100
Fourth 4 2 50
Fifth 4 2 50
Sixth 1 0 0
Seventh 6 3 50
Eighth 7 0 0
Ninth 3 0 0
Tenth 1 0 0
Eleventh 4 3 75
D.C. 0 0 0
Federal 0 0 0
TOTAL 36 14 38.9
C. The Eighth Circuit’s Projected Batting Average on 
Sentencing Cases from Other Circuits Reviewed 
by the Supreme Court 
1. Cases Analyzed 
Between 2005 and 2015, the Supreme Court has reviewed 
thirty-five decisions on federal-sentencing issues. Twenty-eight 
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Eighth Circuit decided twenty cases involving issues identical or 
similar to the issues decided later in one of the twenty-eight 
cases from other circuits.73 Table 7A shows the Supreme Court 
cases originating in other circuits and the comparison cases from 
the Eighth Circuit. Its companion, Table 7B, shows whether the 
Eighth Circuit would have had its decision upheld had the 
Supreme Court reviewed it on each issue, and also shows which 
Eighth Circuit judges sat for each case, whether there were any 
dissents, and whether the Supreme Court’s ultimate holding was 
pro-government, pro-defendant, or neutral.74 Table 8 lists the 
eight cases from other circuits decided by the Supreme Court on 
sentencing issues that the Eighth Circuit had not yet addressed 
when the Supreme Court issued its opinions. 
Table 7A 
Supreme Court Federal-Sentencing Cases Since 2005 
and Comparable Eighth Circuit Cases
Supreme Court (Originating Circuit) Eighth Circuit 
U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (7th) U.S. v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2000) 
Shepard v. U.S., 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (1st) U.S. v. Blahowski, 324 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2003) 
Salinas v. U.S., 547 U.S. 188 (2006) (5th) U.S. v. Kenyon, 7 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1993) 
Kimbrough v. U.S., 52 U.S. 85 (2007) (4th) U.S. v. Spears, 469 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 2006) 
Rita v. U.S., 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (4th) U.S. v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2005) 
James v. U.S., 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (11th) U.S. v. Solomon, 998 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1994) 
Begay v. U.S., 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (10th) U.S. v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006) 
Irizarry v. U.S., 553 U.S. 708 (2008) (11th) U.S. v. Shaw, 180 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1999) 
Chambers v. U.S., 555 U.S. 122 (2009) (7th) U.S. v. Adams, 442 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2006) 
Dillon v. U.S., 560 U.S. 817 (2010) (3d) U.S. v. Jones, 325 Fed. App’x 463 (8th Cir. 2009) 
Abbott v. U.S., 562 U.S. 8 (2010) (3d, 5th) U.S. v. Acosta, 333 Fed. App’x 159 (8th Cir. 2009) 
Freeman v. U.S., 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (6th) U.S. v. Scurlark, 530 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2009) 
73. The decision of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Spears was used as the 
comparison case for Kimbrough v. United States, despite the fact that Spears was reviewed 
by the Supreme Court, because Kimbrough was a later Supreme Court decision on the 
same issue. It should be noted that, because of this, the Eighth Circuit is scored with an 
incorrect decision for its holding in Spears as a comparison case as well as for the holding 
as its own case.  
74. A pro-government decision is simply a holding in which the Court ruled in favor of 
a position asserted by the government. Contrarily, a pro-defendant decision is a holding in 
which the Court ruled in favor of a position asserted by the defendant. A neutral holding is 
one in which the particular facts of a case could lead to an outcome in favor of the 
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Table 7A 
Supreme Court Federal-Sentencing Cases 
and Comparable Eighth Circuit Cases Since 2005 (continued) 
Supreme Court (Originating Circuit) Eighth Circuit
DePierre v. U.S., 564 U.S. 70 (2011) (1st) U.S. v. Vesey, 33 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2003) 
Tapia v. U.S., 564 U.S. 319 (2011) (9th) U.S. v. Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2006) 
Sykes v. U.S., 564 U.S. 1 (2011) (7th)  U.S. v. Tyler, 580 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2009) 
Dorsey v. U.S., 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (7th) U.S. v. Sidney, 648 F.3d 904 (2011) 
Setser v. U.S., 566 U.S. 231 (2012) (5th) U.S. v. Lowe, 312 Fed. App’x 836 (8th Cir. 2009) 
Peugh v. U.S., 569 U.S. 530 (2012) (7th) U.S. v. Braggs, 196 Fed. App’x 442 (8th Cir. 2006) 
Alleyne v. U.S., 570 U.S. 99 (2012) (4th) U.S. v. Keller, 423 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2005) 
Descamps v. U.S., 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (9th) U.S. v. Webster, 636 F.3d 916 (8th Cir. 2011) 
Table 7B 
Characteristics of Supreme-Court Comparable Eighth Circuit Federal-Sentencing Cases
Case Correct Judges Dissent Result
Aguayo-Delgado No Bowman Gibson Loken Pro Defense 
Blahowski Yes Wollman Bright Gibson Bright Neutral
Kenyon Yes McMillian Fagg Hansen Pro Defense 
Spears No Loken Lay Wollman Murphy Bye Riley Melloy Smith Colloton Gruender Benton Shepard Bye Lay Pro Defense 
Lincoln Yes Arnold* Murphy Benton Pro Govt 
Solomon Yes Bowman Wollman Hansen Pro Govt 
McCall No Loken Lay Wollman Arnold
* Murphy Bye 
Riley Melloy Smith Colloton Benton 
Lay Bye 
Wollman Pro Defense 
Shaw Yes Gruender McMillian Murphy Pro Govt 
Adams No Arnold* Beam Riley Pro Defense 
Jones Yes Murphy Smith Kays Pro Govt 
Acosta Yes Murphy Arnold* Gruender Pro Govt 
Scurlark No Loken Melloy Benton Pro Defense 
Vesey No Wollman Arnold** Smith Pro Govt 
Hawk Wing No Loken Bye Smith Pro Defense 
Tyler No Smith Shepard Limbaugh Limbaugh Pro Govt 
Sidney No Riley Gruender Limbaugh Pro Defense 
Lowe Yes Murphy Smith Kays Pro Govt 
Braggs Yes Melloy Beam Benton Pro Defense 
Keller No Wollman Bright Bye Bright Pro Defense 
Webster Yes Riley Melloy Gruender Neutral
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Table 8 
Supreme Court Federal-Sentencing Cases Since 2005 
Without Comparable Eighth Circuit Federal-Sentencing Cases 
Case Originating Circuit 
Logan v. U.S., 552 U.S. 23 (2007) Seventh
Watson v. U.S., 552 U.S. 74 (2007) Fifth
U.S. v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008) Ninth
Dean v. U.S., 556 U.S. 568 (2009) Eleventh 
U.S. v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010) First
Johnson v. U.S., 559 U.S. 133 (2010) Eleventh 
McNeill v. U.S., 563 U.S. 816 (2011) Fourth 
Southern Union Co. v. U.S., 567 U.S. 343 (2012) Fifth
2. The Eighth Circuit’s Team Batting Averages 
Table 9 shows the projected affirmation rates of the Eighth 
Circuit in the cases on federal-sentencing issues from circuits 
other than the Eighth Circuit that are shown above in Table 8. 
The cases are broken down into three categories: pro-
government, pro-defendant, and neutral.75 Using these twenty 
cases as predictors of how the Supreme Court would have ruled 
on the Eighth Circuit’s stance on an issue, Team Eighth Circuit 
would have batted .500 in those cases. The Eighth Circuit batted 
.750 in pro-government decisions (think of a left-handed batter 
against a righty pitcher), .200 in pro-defendant decisions, and 
went two for two in neutral decisions. These statistics are set out 
in Table 9 and graphed in Charts 4 and 5. 
If one were to add the decisions from these twenty 
projected results with the seven Eighth Circuit decisions on 
federal-sentencing issues actually reviewed by the Supreme 
Court shown in Table 4, the Eighth Circuit would have gotten 
hits in ten out of twenty-seven decisions. This correlates to a 
team batting average of .370 on sentencing issues. Similarly, if 
one were to combine the twenty projected federal-sentencing 
decisions with the thirty-four decisions on sentencing issues 
decided by the Eighth Circuit that were reviewed by the 
Supreme Court (six of which Team Eighth Circuit got correct, as 
shown in Table 1), the Eighth Circuit would have gotten hits in 
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sixteen out of fifty-four decisions. This correlates to a batting 
average of .296. This projected team batting average would be 
seventh best among the circuits.76
Table 9 
Projected Eighth Circuit Results in Cases that Follow 
Supreme Court Sentencing Decisions Originating in Other Circuits
ALL CASES 
Number of Cases Eighth Circuit Likely Correct Likely Percentage Correct 
20 10 50%
PRO-GOVERNMENT RESULT 
Number of Cases Eighth Circuit Likely Correct Likely Percentage Correct 
8 6 75%
PRO-DEFENDANT RESULT 
Number of Cases Eighth Circuit Likely Correct Likely Percentage Correct 
10 2 20%
NEUTRAL RESULT 
Number of Cases Eighth Circuit Likely Correct Likely Percentage Correct 
2 2 100%
76. Team Eighth Circuit would fall between Team Second Circuit at 33.3 percent and 
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3. Eighth Circuit Judges’ Individual Batting Averages 
Tables 10A and 10B are breakdowns of the voting records 
of the Eighth Circuit’s judges on the federal-sentencing issues 
reviewed by the Supreme Court in cases that originated in other 
circuits.77 Like the statistics shown in Table 7B, these individual 
batting averages show the voting record for every judge. Table 
10A shows each judge’s overall voting record. Table 10B shows 
those votes broken down into three categories, providing 
information about each judge’s batting average in cases that 
resulted in pro-government rulings, those that resulted in pro-
defendant rulings, and those in which the results can be 
classified as neutral decisions favoring neither the government 
nor the defendant.78
77. Votes by District Judges Kays and Limbaugh, who sometimes sat by designation 
during the period of the study, have been omitted from Tables 10A and 10B.
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Table 10A 
Eighth Circuit Judges’ Overall Voting Records:
Sentencing Issues Decided in Supreme Court Cases 
Originating in Other Circuits
Judge Cases Number of Correct Votes Percent Correct 
M. Arnold 4 2 50 
R. Arnold 1 0 0
Beam 2 1 50 
Benton 5 2 40 
Bowman 2 1 50 
Bright 2 1 50 
Bye 4 2 50 
Colloton 2 0 0
Fagg 1 1 100 
Gibson 2 1 50 
Gruender 5 3 60 
Hansen 1 1 100 
Lay 2 2 100 
Loken 5 0 0
McMillian 2 2 100 
Melloy 5 2 40 
Murphy 7 4 57.1
Riley 5 1 20 
Shepard 2 0 0
Smith 7 2 28.6
Wollman 6 2 33.3
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Table 10B 
Eighth Circuit Judges’ Voting Records by Result: 
Sentencing Issues Decided in Supreme Court Cases 
Originating in Other Circuits
Judge ProGov Correct % ProDef Correct % Neutral Correct %
M. Arnold 2 2 100 2 0 0 0 0 0
R Arnold 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Beam 0 0 0 2 1 50 0 0 0
Benton 1 1 100 4 1 25 0 0 0
Bowman 1 1 100 1 0 0 0 0 0
Bright 0 0 0 1 1 100 1 0 0
Bye 0 0 0 4 2 50 0 0 0
Colloton 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Fagg 0 0 0 1 1 100 0 0 0
Gibson 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 100
Gruender 2 2 100 2 0 0 1 1 100
Hansen 0 0 0 1 1 100 0 0 0
Lay 0 0 0 2 2 100 0 0 0
Loken 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0
McMillian 1 1 100 1 1 100 0 0 0
Melloy 0 0 0 4 1 25 1 1 100
Murphy 5 5 100 2 0 0 0 0 0
Riley 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 100
Shepard 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Smith 4 2 50 3 0 0 0 0 0
Wollman 2 1 50 3 0 0 1 1 100
TOTAL 20 15 75 46 11 23.9 6 5 83.3 
VI. CONCLUSION
 “[R]eversal statistics are easy to calculate but can be 
difficult to interpret.79
Between 2005 and 2015, the Eighth Circuit was slumping 
in its plate appearances with the Supreme Court. On all 
decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court during those years, 
Team Eighth Circuit’s batting average ranks second worst, only 
slightly ahead of the Sixth Circuit. Even when omitting the zero-
to-seven stretch on federal-sentencing issues, the Eighth Circuit 
still ranks third worst among all the circuits. 
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The performance of the Eighth Circuit’s federal-sentencing 
jurisprudence in the Supreme Court in recent years has been 
poor, but perplexing. Whether political affiliation or judicial 
philosophy explains it is unknown. What is known is that the 
Eighth Circuit consistently makes sentencing-issue rulings in 
favor of the government that the Supreme Court ultimately 
rejects.
Wouldn’t it be interesting if each federal court of appeals 
had a team manager selected by its chief judge—perhaps the 
circuit executive—to annually post batting averages on each of 
the courts’ websites? Such transparency, by the least transparent 
branch of government, would be refreshing. 
VII. POSTSCRIPT
Since the decade of 2005 to 2015, the Supreme Court 
decided two additional sentencing cases from the Eighth Circuit. 
The slump continues. In Mathis v. United States80 the court 
reversed the Eighth Circuit in a five-to-three decision and held 
that the terms of an Iowa burglary statute were broader than 
those of a generic burglary statute and that Mathis’s conviction 
could not support an Armed Career Criminal Act fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum. 
In Dean v. United States,81 a unanimous Supreme Court 
reversed the Eighth Circuit. I was the sentencing judge.82 Here’s 
what happened: 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Dean was convicted of two 
counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of 
violence that required a thirty-year mandatory minimum on 
those counts. He was also convicted of four other counts with a 
Guidelines range of eighty-four to 105 months. Dean asked me 
to simply add one additional day consecutive to the thirty-year 
mandatory sentence. I declined, because I was foreclosed by 
existing Eighth Circuit precedent but stated on the record that I 
80. ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
81. ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017). 
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would if I could.83 On remand, I reduced the sentences on the 
four counts from a Guideline range to one day.84
At bottom, every one of the nine Eighth Circuit sentencing 
decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court over the past thirteen 
years has been reversed. Assuming for the sake of argument a 
binary result at the Supreme Court of either affirmed or 
reversed, and further assuming a fifty percent chance of each, 
the odds of the Eighth Circuit being wrong nine times in a row 
are one in 512.85
But wait, there is more. On June 4, 2018, on my sixty-
eighth birthday, the Supreme Court finally affirmed the Eighth 
Circuit, and—ironically—me, in Koons v. United States.86 The 
Court unanimously held that the petitioners did not qualify for 
additional reductions from their original sentences, where I had 
granted substantial assistance motions, because under 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) their sentences were not “based on” their lowered 
Guidelines ranges but, rather, on their mandatory minimums and 
their substantial assistance to the government.87
83. Id. at 1172–75 (discussing sentencing in district court). 
84. United States v. Dean, No. CR13-4082-MWB (N.D. Iowa July 17, 2017) (amended 
judgment). 
85. For those keeping score at home, the calculation is 129 =1 in 512.  
86. ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1783 (2018). 
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APPENDIX
Supreme Court Cases Addressing Federal-Sentencing Issues Since 200588
Case Circuit Decision Overview of Holding 
Lopez v. Gonzales,
549 U.S. 47 (2006) 8 Reversed 
A misdemeanor under the Controlled 
Substance Act is not a “felony 
punishable under the Controlled 
Substance Act,” when the conduct is 
made a felony under state law.
Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38 (2007) 8 Reversed 
Abuse of discretion standard of 
review applies to all appellate 
review of sentencing decisions, 
regardless of whether the sentence is 
inside or outside the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines range.
Greenlaw v. United States, 
554 U.S. 237 (2008) 8 Reversed 
Appellate courts cannot increase a 
defendant’s sentence when the 
government did not appeal the 
sentence.
Spears v. United States, 
555 U.S. 261 (2009) 8 Reversed 
Under Kimbrough and Booker, a 
district court may depart from the 
Guidelines range based on a policy 
disagreement with the Guidelines, as 
well as due to reasoning that the 
Guidelines yield an inappropriate 
sentence in a given case.
88. All overviews except those for Johnson (2015), Sykes (2011), Dean (2009), Lopez 
(2006), and Salinas (2006), are based on more detailed case summaries prepared by the 
United States Sentencing Commission. See generally Office of General Counsel, U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, Selected Supreme Court Cases on Sentencing Issues (July 2015), 
available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/case-law-documents/supreme 
-court-cases.pdf; Office of General Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Supreme Court 
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Supreme Court Cases Addressing Federal-Sentencing Issues Since 2005 
(continued) 
Case Circuit Decision Overview of Holding 
Pepper v. United States, 
562 U.S. 476 (2011) 8 Reversed 
When a sentence has been set aside 
on appeal, a district court may, at 
resentencing, consider a defendant’s 
post-sentencing behavior and vary 
from the Guidelines range 
accordingly.
Burrage v. United States, 
571 U.S. 204 (2014) 8 Reversed 
A defendant who distributes drugs 
cannot receive an enhanced sentence 
when a victim dies or is seriously 
injured as a result of using the drugs 
unless the use of the drugs is a but-
for cause of the death or injury, 
when the drug was not 
independently sufficient to cause the 
death or injury. 
Johnson v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) 8 Reversed 
Courts may no longer impose an 
increased sentence under the residual 
clause of the Armed Career Criminal 
Act as it violates due process. 
United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220 (2005) 7 Affirmed 
Any fact, other than a prior 
conviction, that is used to enhance a 
sentence beyond the maximum 
established by a guilty plea or jury 
verdict must be admitted by 
defendant or proved to a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines are to be 
treated as advisory. 
Shepard v. United States, 
544 U.S. 13 (2005) 1 Reversed 
A sentencing court cannot look 
outside of the judicial record (such 
as the charging document, plea 
agreement, or transcript) in making a 
determination whether a “generic 
burglary” qualifies as a violent 
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Supreme Court Cases Addressing Federal-Sentencing Issues Since 2005 
(continued) 
Case Circuit Decision Overview of Holding 
Salinas v. United States, 
547 U.S. 188 (2006) 5 Reversed 
Simple possession offenses are not 
considered “controlled substance 
offenses” under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act. 
Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) 4 Reversed 
A sentencing court may consider the 
disparity between the treatment of 
crack and cocaine offenses in the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines when 
making a sentencing determination.   
Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338 (2007) 4 Affirmed 
Courts of appeals may apply a 
presumption of reasonableness when 
reviewing a district court decision to 
impose a sentence within the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines range. 
James v. United States, 
550 U.S. 192 (2007) 11 Affirmed 
A conviction under Florida law for 
attempted burglary qualified as a 
“violent felony” under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act.  
Logan v. United States, 
552 U.S. 23 (2007) 7 Affirmed 
A violent felony offense under state 
law, for which a defendant’s civil 
rights were never revoked, does not 
qualify for the “civil rights restored” 
exemption under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act.
Watson v. United States, 
552 U.S. 74 (2007) 5 Reversed 
A defendant who trades drugs for a 
firearm does not use the firearm 
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).  
Begay v. United States, 
553 U.S. 137 (2008) 10 Reversed 
A felony conviction for driving 
under the influence is not a “violent 
felony” under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act. 
United States v. 
Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 
(2008)
9 Reversed 
Recidivist enhancements under state 
law should be used in calculating 
“maximum term of imprisonment” 
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Supreme Court Cases Addressing Federal-Sentencing Issues Since 2005 
(continued) 
Case Circuit Decision Overview of Holding 
Irizarry v. United States, 
553 U.S. 708 (2008) 11 Affirmed 
District courts are not required to 
provide advanced notice to the 
parties when varying a defendant’s 
sentence outside of the 
recommended Guidelines range.  
Chambers v. United States, 
555 U.S. 122 (2009) 7 Reversed 
The defendant’s prior conviction for 
failure to report for periodic 
incarceration does not qualify as a 
“violent felony” under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act. 
Dean v. United States, 
556 U.S. 568 (2009) 11 Affirmed 
Discharging a weapon during a 
violent or drug-trafficking crime, 
triggering the ten-year mandatory 
minimum, requires no separate proof 
of intent to discharge the gun under 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)
Dillon v. United States, 
560 U.S. 817 (2010) 3 Affirmed 
Booker does not apply to sentence-
reduction proceedings under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.10 is binding on courts 
engaging in sentence reductions. 
United States v. O’Brien,
560 U.S. 218 (2010) 1 Affirmed 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924, the fact that 
a firearm is an automatic weapon is 
an element of the offense and must 
be proved to a jury. 
Johnson v. United States, 
559 U.S. 133 (2010) 11 Reversed 
Battery, defined under Florida law as 
“[a]ctually and intentionally 
touch[ing]” another person, is not 
considered a “violent felony” under 
the Armed Career Criminal Act.  
Abbott v. United States, 
562 U.S. 8 (2010)89 3 & 5 Affirmed 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 924, a defendant 
is subject to consecutive mandatory 
minimum sentences for both a
predicate offense and a § 924 
offense, even if the predicate offense 
carries a greater penalty.  
89. Abbott, a consolidated case that settled a circuit split, originated in the Third and 
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Supreme Court Cases Addressing Federal-Sentencing Issues Since 2005 
(continued) 
Case Circuit Decision Overview of Holding
Freeman v. United States, 
564 U.S. 522 (2011) 
6 Reversed 
Defendant is eligible for a sentence 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 
even when he entered into a Rule 
11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement before 
the Sentencing Commission 
amended the Guidelines lowering 
the base level for drug offenses 
involving crack.  
DePierre v. United States, 
564 U.S. 70 (2011) 
1 Affirmed 
Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 
the term “cocaine base” should be 
read to include all forms of cocaine 
base (or cocaine in its chemically 
basic form), and should not be 
limited to “crack cocaine.” 
Tapia v. United States, 
564 U.S. 319 (2011) 
9 Reversed 
A sentencing court may not impose 
or lengthen a sentence in an effort to 
aid a defendant’s rehabilitation.  
McNeill v. United States, 
564 U.S. 319 (2011) 
4 Affirmed 
Under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act, a sentencing court should look 
to the length of the maximum 
sentence applicable to a state law 
offense at the time the offense was 
committed when determining if an 
offense is a “serious drug offense.” 
This applies when maximum 
sentence has later been reduced.  
Sykes v. United States, 
564 U.S. 1 (2011), 
overruled by Johnson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551 (2015) 
7 Affirmed 
Using the “categorical approach” the 
Court found a state offense of felony 
vehicle flight qualifies as a “violent 
felony” under the “residual clause” 
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Supreme Court Cases Addressing Federal-Sentencing Issues Since 2005 
(continued) 
Case Circuit Decision Overview of Holding 
Dorsey v. United States, 
562 U.S. 260 (2012) 7 Reversed 
The Fair Sentencing Act’s reduction 
in the mandatory minimum for crack 
cocaine offenders applies to offenders 
sentenced after the reduction was 
enacted, even if their offense was 
committed before the enactment.  
Setser v. United States, 
566 U.S. 231 (2012)
5 Affirmed 
District court can order federal 
sentence to be served consecutive to 
state sentence not yet imposed. 
Southern Union Company 
v. United States,
567 U.S. 343 (2012)
1 Reversed 
The holding in Apprendi—that any 
fact (other than a prior conviction) 
that increases a defendant’s 
maximum sentence must be proved 
to a jury—also applies to fines.  
Peugh v. United States, 
569 U.S. 530 (2013) 7 Reversed 
Despite the fact that the Guidelines 
are advisory, a court may not impose 
a sentence under a Guidelines range 
that results in a longer range than the 
Guidelines range in effect at the time 
the offense was committed. 
Alleyene v. United States, 
570 U.S. 99 (2013) 4 Reversed 
Any facts that increase a mandatory 
minimum penalty are elements of an 
offense and must be proved to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Descamps v. United States, 
570 U.S. 254 (2013) 9 Reversed 
Under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act, a sentencing court may not 
employ the “modified categorical 
approach” to state convictions under 
statutes that are not composed of 
alternative elements.  
